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%XLOGLQJD3RVW:DU-XVWLFH6\VWHPLQ$IJKDQLVWDQ
E\
$OL:DUGDN&HQWUHIRU&ULPLQRORJ\8QLYHUVLW\RI*ODPRUJDQ8.
 
$EVWUDFW
 
7KLV SDSHU H[DPLQHV NH\ GLPHQVLRQV RI MXVWLFH LQ SRVWZDU $IJKDQLVWDQ 7KHVH DUH
VKDUL¶D ,VODPLF ODZ WUDGLWLRQDO LQVWLWXWLRQV RI LQIRUPDO MXVWLFH MLUJD WKH$IJKDQ
LQWHULPOHJDOIUDPHZRUNDQGKXPDQULJKWVSULQFLSOHV,WLVDUJXHGWKDWGHVSLWHWKHLU
DSSDUHQW LQFRPSDWLELOLW\ WKHVH YDULRXV GLPHQVLRQV RI MXVWLFH FRXOG EH LQWHJUDWHG
ZLWKLQ D FRKHUHQW IUDPHZRUN RI D QHZ MXVWLFH V\VWHP LQ SRVWZDU $IJKDQLVWDQ ± D
IUDPHZRUN WKDW ZRXOG SURPRWH LQWHUDFWLRQ EHWZHHQ ORFDO LQVWLWXWLRQV RI LQIRUPDO
MXVWLFHDQGDGLVWULFW OHYHOFRXUWRI MXVWLFHRQ WKHRQHKDQGDQGEHWZHHQ WKHVH WZR
DQG D SURSRVHG+XPDQ5LJKWV XQLW RQ WKH RWKHU2Q WKH EDVLV RI WKLV DQDO\VLV DQ
H[SHULPHQWDOPRGHO RI D V\VWHP RI MXVWLFH LV SURSRVHGZKLFK LQWHJUDWHV ORFDO MLUJD
DQG+XPDQ5LJKWVXQLWVLQWRWKHH[LVWLQJIRUPDOMXVWLFHEDVHGRQVKDUL¶DDQGSRVLWLYH
ODZ DQG ODZHQIRUFHPHQW LQVWLWXWLRQV 7KLV H[SHULPHQWDO PRGHO SURYLGHV D PXOWL
GLPHQVLRQDOIUDPHZRUNWKDWERWKUHIOHFWVWKHFXOWXUDODQGUHOLJLRXVYDOXHVRI$IJKDQ
VRFLHW\DQGDWWKHVDPHWLPHKDVWKHFDSDFLW\WRGUDZRQKXPDQULJKWVSULQFLSOHV,W
LVPDLQWDLQHG WKDW WKHPRGHOKDV WKHFDSDFLW\ WRGHOLYHU MXVWLFHH[SHGLWLRXVO\DQGLQ
FRVWHIIHFWLYH ZD\V LW DOVR KDV D VWURQJ SRWHQWLDO WR DFW DV D FKDQQHO RI
FRPPXQLFDWLRQ EHWZHHQ RUGLQDU\ SHRSOH DQG DPRGHUQ SDUWLFLSDWRU\ VWDWH LQ SRVW
ZDU$IJKDQLVWDQ+RZHYHULQRUGHUWRWHVWWKHDSSOLFDELOLW\RIWKLVPRGHOLQWKHUHDO
ZRUOGLWQHHGVILUVWWREHWKRURXJKO\GLVFXVVHGDPRQJ$IJKDQDQGLQWHUQDWLRQDOOHJDO
H[SHUWV DV ZHOO DV DPRQJ RUGLQDU\ $IJKDQ SHRSOH DQG WKHQ SLORWHG LQ VHOHFWHG
GLVWULFWVLQ$IJKDQLVWDQ
  
,QWURGXFWLRQ
 
The formal justice system of Afghanistan has been influenced, to varying degrees, by 
Western (mainly French) legal thought and moderate Islam, radical Marxism, and by 
radical interpretations of Islam. These influences, by and large, reflected the values, 
ideologies, and politics of the various governments that Afghanistan has witnessed 
since its emergence as a politically organised society. In the 1950s and 1960s, the 
justice systemwas modernised and state law, rather than VKDUL¶D became the primary 
source of the justice system. After the military coup in 1978, the Marxist government 
attempted to introduce a Soviet-style judicial system, but these changes were rejected 
before they took root. The subsequent PXMDKHGLQ regime of 1992–96 declared VKDUL¶D 
as the basis of the state, and this was further entrenched by the WDOLEDQ’s regime. 
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While most of these regimes have partly used their systems of justice as tools for 
achieving their political goals, they have nevertheless contributed to the richness of 
Afghan legal culture; there is much within these different doctrines and approaches 
that could be fruitfully used and integrated in a post-war justice system.
 
It is also important to mention that, as the formal Afghan justice system was elitist, 
corrupt and involved long delays, many Afghans avoided contacts with it. As a result, 
many Afghans - particularly in rural areas - continued to use traditional institutions of 
informal justice such as MLUJD PDUDND, and VKXUD (see footnotes 1 and 2 for a 
distinction between these concepts). Although the practices of these traditional 
institutions of popular justice sometimes conflicted with Afghan legal norms and with 
international standards of human rights, they nevertheless resolved tribal and local 
conflicts expeditiously and in cost-effective ways (Wardak 2002).  
 
Since the establishment of the Afghan Interim Administration in December 2001 (and 
later the Afghan Transitional Authority), and the reinstatement of the 1964 Afghan 
Constitution and ‘existing laws’, there has been a new emphasis on the need to 
incorporate international human rights principles into Afghan justice institutions 
(Decree on the Establishment of Afghan Judicial Commission 2002). The increasing 
involvement of the international community and the UN in the social, political and 
economic reconstruction of Afghanistan appears to necessitate the compatibility of the 
Afghan justice system with international standards and principles of human rights.  
 
In this paper, key dimensions of the post-war justice system in Afghanistan are 
examined. These are: VKDUL¶D (Islamic law) traditional informal justice (MLUJD), 
‘existing laws’ (interim legal framework) and human rights principles. On the basis of 
an analysis of the interrelationships among these, an experimental integrated model of 
post-war justice system in Afghanistan is proposed. However, first, it is important to 
place the subject of examination in this paper in the general context of Afghan society 
and nearly a quarter of a century of conflict in the country. 
 
7KH$IJKDQ&RQWH[W
 
Afghanistan is a land-locked country that lies at the crossroad between South and 
Central Asia. To the North and Northwest of the country lie the former Soviet 
republics of Uzbekistan, Tajekistan, and Turkmenistan; to the South and East is 
Pakistan; to the West of Afghanistan lies Iran and to its North-East is China.  It is this 
strategic geo-political location of Afghanistan that has made it both a cross-road 
between civilizations and a battlefield between competing global and regional powers. 
 
The total population of Afghanistan is estimated to be between 20 – 25 million, 
composed of various ethnic and tribal groups, most of whom have lived together in 
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the country for centuries. These include Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek, Turkmen, 
Aimaq, Baluch, Brahui, Nuristani, Pashaie, Pamiri, Kirghiz, Qizilbash, Mongols, 
Arabs, Gujars, Kohistanis, Wakhis and Jats. Among these, the Pashtuns constitute the 
largest ethnic group (estimatedly around 50% of the total Afghan population), 
followed by Tajiks, Hazras and Uzbeks (Dupree 1980; Canfield 1986; Glatzer 1998; 
Wardak 2003).  
 
Although these various Afghan groups are generally distinguishable from one another 
by their members’  distinct language (or accent) and ethnic origin, for generations 
trade and commerce, universities/colleges, government institutions and cross-regional 
employment opportunities have pulled thousands of Afghans from different 
ethnic/tribal backgrounds to live and work side by side. Furthermore, inter-marriages, 
service in the national army and police, and participation in shared cultural, religious 
and social activities have strengthened citizenship at the expense of ethnic/tribal 
affiliations in urban centers and cities. This interaction among Pashtuns, Tajiks, 
Hazaras, Uzbaks, Turkmen’ s and other Afghan ethnic and tribal groups has resulted in 
a cultural fusion among various Afghan ethnic and tribal cultural traditions at the 
national level. The richness of Afghan national culture owes much to this centuries 
old multi-cultural fusion.  
 
However, since the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in 1979, the country 
has been used as battlefield between competing global and regional powers and 
groups - a battlefield between the former Communist USSR and the Capitalist West 
(mainly the USA) in the 1980s; in the 1990s a battlefield between Pakistan, the Arab 
Gulf countries, on the one hand, and Iran and Russia on the other; and more recently a 
battlefield between foreign Muslim extremist groups and a right-wing US 
administration. In this process of rivalry, Afghanistan’ s main immediate neighbours 
infiltrated deep into Afghan politics. With competing interests in the country, they 
created their client factions/warlords and sponsored them militarily, financially and 
politically. The factions gradually became so dependent on their foreign sponsors that 
they saw Afghanistan’ s interests through the eyes of these foreigners. These 
neighbours also exploited Afghanistan’ s existing ethnic and religious composition and 
justified their interventions on the grounds that they had common religious and ethnic 
ties with their clients. Thus the armed conflict (which continued for several years even 
after the defeat of the former Red Army) resulted in the extensive destruction of 
Afghanistan’ s economic, political and social infrastructure. The Western world, 
particularly the USA, which lured the Soviets to invade Afghanistan (Brezinzski 
1998, Cooley 2002), and strongly supported the Afghan PXMDKHGLQ - Islamic warriors 
- almost completely abandoned the ruined country after the Red Army was defeated.  
 
The destruction of the country’ s economic infrastructure, particularly, provided 
opportunities for foreign players and their client Afghan warring factions to exploit 
the situation, seeking their strategic goals and sectarian interests at the expense of the 
Afghan population. The almost total collapse of the Afghan pre-war economy 
gradually resulted in the emergence of a ‘war economy’  (Rubin 1999; Goodhand 
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2003) - economic conditions that mainly centred on the manufacturing, repair, use and 
smuggling of weapons and ammunition, on the one hand, and on the smuggling (and 
production) of illicit drugs and national treasure on the other. The nearly a quarter of a 
century long conflict also resulted in a generation of young people who were largely 
deprived of the opportunity of gaining educational qualifications and other useful 
skills. This ‘war generation’  of thousands of young people has also been deeply 
traumatised by the war - many lost their parents, relatives and homes. The various 
factions were able to recruit their fighters from amongst this war generation, so that 
the conflict in which they had a stake continued. Fighting for one or other warlord 
provided these young men with a source of income, social status, and a way of 
channelling their energies. More importantly, this situation provided the opportunity 
for foreign Muslim extremist groups - mainly the DOTD¶DGD - to use Afghan soil as 
headquarters for terrorist activities against other nations. There now exists an 
increasingly convincing body of evidence, which links the Afghanistan-based DO
TD¶DGD to the 11 September terrorist attacks on New York’ s Twin Towers and on 
other targets in the United States.  
 
In the wake of the US-led military campaign in Afghanistan that resulted in the 
collapse of the Taliban regime, the Bonn Agreement of December 2001 was signed 
among the representatives of Northern Alliance warlords, pro-Zahir Shah (former 
King of Afghanistan) technocrats/intellectuals, and two other small Afghan groups 
that were mainly based in Pakistan and Iran. Although the four anti-Taliban groups 
did not consult (or represent) the people of Afghanistan, the Bonn Agreement which 
was signed in a rush, did open the possibility of a new participatory political order for 
Afghanistan. It provided a framework of state formation processes that aimed at the 
eventual creation of ‘broad-based, multi-ethnic and fully representative’  government 
by 2004. The Agreement, which resulted in the establishment of the Afghan Interim 
Administration in December 2001, raised hopes among many Afghans that there was 
an opportunity to end warlordism in Afghanistan and rebuild the country’ s social, 
political and economic institutions. However, the reinstatement of most warlords as 
key political and military leaders in the post-Taliban administration, and the US 
government's emphasis on the 'war against terrorism' rather than on rebuilding 
Afghanistan, has spread disillusion among many Afghans about the prospects of 
lasting peace. The US’ s military financial support for warlords, who may cooperate in 
hunting down remnants of the WDOLEDQ and DOTD
DGD, continues to be a major obstacle 
to the development of national participatory institutions in Afghanistan, and therefore, 
a major source of increasing instability in the country. 
 
Despite thisthe people of Afghanistan still expect the patriotic Afghan leaders/forces 
and the fair-minded international players to help them lay down the foundations of 
participatory institutions and lasting peace in the country. Most Afghans see the 
deployment of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), economic 
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reconstruction plans, and the UN-led political stabilisation process in Afghanistan as a 
unique opportunity for rebuilding their country and for its re-integration into the 
global community. These efforts may, for the first time in the past 25 years, provide 
common ground between the interests of the international community and the 
interests of the ordinary Afghan people. Central to political stabilisation and to the re-
building of social and political order in Afghanistan is the establishment of an 
effective system of justice in the country. In this paper, key dimensions of a post-war 
justice system in Afghanistan are identified and discussed. One of the most important 
of these is VKDUL¶D 

.H\'LPHQVLRQVRI3RVW:DUMXVWLFHLQ$IJKDQLVWDQ

,6KDUL¶D,VODPLF/DZ
 
As the overwhelming majority of the people of Afghanistan are Muslim, Islamic 
teachings and VKDUL¶D permeate various spheres of life in Afghan society. Thus, 
VKDUL¶D has strongly influenced the development of Afghan justice since the 
emergence of Afghanistan as a politically organised society. The population of 
Afghanistan is mainly divided by their religious following into an estimated 80 – 85 
% of VXQQLV and 15 – 20 % VKHL¶LWH The overwhelming majority of VXQQLV in 
Afghanistan are followers of the KDQDIL school; Afghan VKHL¶LWH are, by and large, 
followers of the MD¶DIDUL jurisprudential school. 
 
6KDUL¶Dis an Arabic word, which means ‘the path to follow’ ; it is also used to refer to 
legislation, legitimacy, and legality in modern Arabic literature. However, VKDUL¶Din a 
jurisprudential context means Islamic Law. The primary sources of VKDUL¶D are the 
TXUDQ and the VXQQDK The first refers to the holy book of Islam, and the second to the 
statements and deeds of the Prophet Mohammad. However, relatively small portions 
of the verses of the TXUDQand the contents of the VXQQDKinclude legislative material 
(Lippman et al 1988). Taken together, the two do not seemingly provide answers to 
all types of legal issues. However, the TXUDQ and the VXQQDK do lay down general 
principles as well specific rules that are subject to interpretation and analysis. Thus, 
after the death of the Prophet Mohammad, the cDOLSKV (leaders of the Muslim 
community) and the VRKDED (the Prophet’ s associates) appointed consultants to help 
in the correct interpretation of the TXUDQ and the VXQQDKandin the extraction of rules 
(for new situations) that seemingly did not exist in the two primary sources of VKDUL¶D
As a result, TL\DV and ,MPDwere added as secondary sources of VKDUL¶D

4L\DV, in the context of Islamic jurisprudence, means analogical reasoning. That is, 
cases and questions not seemingly answered by the primary sources are deduced from 
similar original cases in the TXUDQ or in the VXQQDK through a process of reasoning by 
analogy. This process was handled only by those Islamic jurists who met strict criteria 
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relating to their knowledge, piety and personal integrity; they were also required to 
fulfil very strict conditions for the kind of cases that were handled by TL\DV.  
 
The fourth source of VKDUL¶D, LMPDmeans the consensus of Islamic jurists on a ruling. 
When qualified Islamic jurists reached a unanimous agreement on solution to a 
specific new problem, their opinion became binding with absolute authority. In this 
way the outcomes of both TL\DV and LMPD were transformed into statements of divine 
law. This has, in turn, resulted in the documentation and compilation of hundreds of 
cases and books that are used, today, as references in Islamic jurisprudence (Wardak 
2003). 
 
In the process of the consolidation of the Afghan state institutions, particularly in the 
early 20th century, the KDQDIL school (alongside traditional customary laws) provided 
the basis of the Afghan justice system. This version of the VKDUL¶D existed in 
symbiotic relationships with Afghan customary laws and with VXQQL ‘folk Islam’  that 
generally reflected the cultural, social and economic realities of every day life of the 
overwhelming majority of the people of Afghanistan. 8ODPD (Islamic scholars) 
interpreted this version of Islam and the VKDUL¶D and also worked as TDGL (judge) in 
state courts (Olesen 1995).However, in order to have control over the XODPDand over 
their interpretation of Islam and VKDUL¶D the government established the official 
institution of MDPL¶DW DO XODPD (society of Islamic scholars/jurists) and the state-
funded Islamic PDGUDVDVof GDU±DOR¶OXPHDUDEL and DEXKDQLID in Kabul. While 
MDPL¶DW ±DO XODPD members who were paid very handsome salaries endorsed the 
government policies, the two official PDGUDVDV trained students of Islamic theology 
and jurisprudence as TDGL, or state judges.  
 
In the 1950s and 1960s, as Afghanistan’ s political, economic and cultural 
relationships increased with the rest of the world, the rulers started to modernise the 
Afghan justice system in line with those of the Western world. The justice model that 
Afghan rulers chose to adopt resembled closely the Egyptian model, which was 
strongly influenced by the French and Ottoman legal systems (Kamali 1985). In order 
for the modern Afghan justice system to be run by professional judicial personnel, the 
faculties of Islamic Law and of Law and Political Science were opened at Kabul 
University. Thus, the graduates of GDU ±DO R¶OXPHDUDEL and DEXKDQLIDwere only 
eligible to work as judges after they had studied modern positive laws as well as 
Islamic jurisprudence at the Faculty of VKDULDW. Similarly students at the TD]D\HHDQG
VDUDQZDOL (judiciary and prosecution) branch of the Faculty of Law and Political 
Science were trained to work as judges mainly in the commercial and administrative 
sections of the Afghan judiciary. In addition, from the early 1960s all these graduates 
had to do a nine-month legal training course (including 3 months on-the-job training) 
called NDGUH TD]D\HH. Some working legal professionals/judges and lecturers at the 
faculties of Islamic Law and Law were also sent to the USA and Egypt for further 
legal training. This modernisation process was also accompanied by the codification 
of many Afghan laws in the 1960s and 1970s. 
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This process gradually resulted in the relative secularisation of the Afghan justice 
system, especially in the areas of criminal law, commercial law, and general civil law. 
Thus state law, rather than VKDUL¶D became the primary source of the justice system. 
Nevertheless, VKDUL¶D remained a secondary source. As Article 69 of the 1964 
constitution states: ‘… In area [s] where no such law exists, the provisions of the 
+DQDILjurisprudence of the 6KDULDDW of Islam shall be considered as law.’  While this 
justice system appears to have reflected a balance between Islamic VKDUL¶D and 
modern legal norms, its administration involved long delays, bribery and corruption. 
Many Afghans, particularly in rural areas, avoided contact with state judicial 
institutions (Wardak 2000a). 
 
After the 1978 military coup, the Afghan Marxist government attempted to introduce 
the (former) Soviet-style judicial system in line with its socialist ideological, political 
and economic goals. However, since the Marxist totalitarian regime was at odds with 
both Islam and Afghan traditions, the whole system of governance and its judicial 
reforms (decrees) were massively rejected. After the collapse of the last Afghan 
Marxist government, the PXMDKHGLQ government (1992 – 1996) declared VKDUL¶Das the 
basis of their ‘Islamic State of Afghanistan’ . Despite the fact that the various 
PXMDKHGLQ groups which formed the government interpreted Islam in conflicting 
ways, most of them attempted to impose a totalitarian theocracy of which VKDUL¶Dlaws 
were part and parcel. The WDOLEDQ¶V theocratic regime (1996 – 2001) imposed an even 
more regressive version of VKDUL¶Dmuch of which reflected their ignorance of VKDUL¶D 
as well of a system of justice.  
 
Despite the over (or under) emphasis on the role of VKDUL¶Din Afghan state institutions 
by different political regimes, it remains as an important constituent element of post-
war Afghan justice. This is recognised by the Bonn Agreement (2001:3), which 
emphasises that the Afghan Judicial Commission and the U.N. shall ‘rebuild the 
[Afghan] domestic justice system in accordance with Islamic principles, international 
standards, the rule of law and Afghan legal traditions.’  Past experiences, indeed, show 
that it is only that version of VKDUL¶D that is in harmony with Afghan cultural 
traditions, existing legal norms and fundamental principles of human rights that can 
make important contributions to a credible post-war justice system in Afghanistan.  
 
,,&XVWRPDU\/DZDQG-LUJD
 
The role of the Afghan central government and its formal institutions of justice 
(courts, police, corrections etc.) in maintaining social order in Afghan society has 
always been limited. This particularly applies to rural Afghanistan, where it is 
estimated that over 80% of the Afghan population live. In some southern and eastern 
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parts of the country, formal institutions of justice have no (or just nominal) existence, 
and yet there exist a reasonable degree of social order in these areas.  
 
A great many potentially serious disputes, relating to domestic violence, divorce, 
inheritance and marriage are normally settled within the ‘private’  sphere of the 
Afghan extended family without the involvement of local/tribal or state institutions 
(Wardak 2002a) They are dealt with on the spot before becoming a ‘public’  problem, 
and a burden on other societal institutions. However, those disputes that are 
considered ‘public’  are resolved by public institutions at local and tribal levels. The 
main institution that has traditionally operated as a mechanism of dispute settlement 
(at village and tribe levels) is MLUJDPDUDND among the Pashtuns and its approximate 
equivalent - VKXUD1 - among the non-Pashtuns of Afghanistan (Carter and Conner 
1989; Farhadi 2000; Gletzer 1998; Hashemi 2000; Malekyar 2000). 
 
The term MLUJD according to the Pashto Descriptive Dictionary (1978: 1272) is an 
original Pashto word, which in its common usage, refers to the gathering of a few or a 
large number of people; it also means consultation according to this source. The word 
MLUJD is also used in Persian/Dari. According to JK\DWKXOOXJKDW (1871:119) it is 
derived from MLUJ which means a 'wrestling ring', or 'circle', but is commonly used to 
refer to a gathering of people. Other scholars believe that the word MLUJD originates 
from Turkish, where it has a very similar meaning (Faiz-zad 1989: 5). 

-LUJD   in every day practicerefers to a local/tribal institution of decision-making and 
dispute settlement that incorporates the prevalent local customary law, 
institutionalised rituals, and a body of village elders whose collective decision about 
the resolution of a dispute (or local problem) is binding on the parties involved 
(Wardak 2002b) Those on the MLUJD combine ‘traditional authority’  (based on 
personal qualities, social status, and leadership skills) as well as ‘competent authority’  
(based on the individual's recognised expertise and skills), which play a central part in 
achieving a SULNUD (ruling) that is satisfactory to both parties. 
 
One important form of tribal MLUJD is QDQDZDWH, which means seeking 
forgiveness/pardon and the obligatory acceptance of a truce offer. This happens when 
the tribalMLUJDmakes a SULNUD (decision) that relatives of the SDU(guilty party)send a 
‘delegation’  to the victim’ s house. This consists of a group of people that include 
elders a female relative of the offender holding a copy of the holy TXUDQ, and a 
PXOODK (Muslim priest), alongside the offender's other close relatives (and sometimes 
the offender himself) who bring a sheep and flour to the victim’ s house. The sheep is 
often slaughtered at the door of the victim's house. Once inside the house, the 
delegation seeks pardon on behalf of the offender. As it is against the tribal code of 
behaviour to reject a QDQDZDWHthe victim’ s relatives pardon the offender and the two 
parties are reconciled. This reconciliation is called URJKD. Thus unlike formal state 
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justice, which often labels offenders as different, evil, and excludes them from the 
community, QDQDZDWH reintegrates them into the community. Existing criminological 
knowledge suggests that reintegrative social control is, by and large, more effective in 
reducing crime than disintegrative social control, normally exercised by formal state 
institutions (Braithwaite 1989). 
 
The main reasons that Afghan people have preferred MLUJDVKXUD to formal justice is 
becausethe former is conducted by respected elders with established social status and 
the reputation for piety and fairness. In many cases, the disputants personally know 
the local elders and trust them. In addition, in the context of MLUJDVKXUDelders reach 
decisions in accordance with accepted local traditions/values (customary law) that are 
deeply ingrained in the collective conscience of the village/tribe – they have a 
profound existence in the collective mind of the village and in the minds of its 
individual members. Also unlike state courts, MLUJDVKXUDsettle disputes without long 
delays and without financial costs. Illiteracy plays an important role in discouraging 
people from using the formal courts – the overwhelming majority of Afghans are 
unable to make applications, read/understand the laws or complete the paper work. 

However MLUJDVKXUD has its own problems in some cases of murder MLUJD may 
recommend EDGDO (direct vengeance), or the marriage of a woman from the SDU
s tribe 
to the victim's close relative. Although these practices have become increasingly rare 
in recent years (Johnson at al 2003), the first punishment is in direct conflict with the 
Afghan state laws, and the second one is a clear violation of fundamental human 
rights. In addition, MLUJDVKXUD is generally a male-only institution; it can also be 
excessively influenced sometimes by powerful elders (Noelle-Karimi 1998). More 
importantly, in areas where warlords exercise direct control over the population, 
MLUJDVKXUD decisions are influenced (or undermined) by those with guns and money. 
However, by incorporating MLUJDVKXUDinto the new justice system, it would conform 
to the norms of the national legal order of post-war in Afghanistan. This would, in 
turn, help to make this traditional patriarchal institution more inclusive of both men 
and women. But a pre-requisite for all this is a secure social environment where, 
MLUJDVKXUDand the justice system as a whole could operate without any illegitimate 
influence by warlords. 

,,,,QWHULP/HJDO)UDPHZRUNDQGWKH&XUUHQW-XVWLFHµ6\VWHP¶
 
The Afghan Interim Administration (AIA) that was established as a result of the Bonn 
Agreement in December 2001 inherited a justice system devastated by the 25 year-
long civil conflict in Afghanistan. However, under the Bonn Agreement, the 1964 
Afghan constitution and ‘existing law’  were reinstated with some important 
modifications. In effect, this constitution and the ‘existing laws’  currently provide an 
interim legal framework for Afghanistan. This ‘framework’  represents a mixture of 
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VKDUL¶D and positive laws that were enforced until the Marxist coup data in 1978. 
 
Under the Bonn Agreement, the establishment of an independent Judicial 
Commission of Afghanistan was authorised. It was envisaged that the Commission 
(with the assistance of the UN) would provide the opportunity for Afghanistan’ s best 
legal scholars and practitioners to review and reform the Afghan domestic Justice 
system. However, in view of the vastly devastated state of the post-war Afghan justice 
‘system’ , much of it needs rebuilding and even building from scratch. The Judicial 
Commission, which has a huge and complex task ahead of it, currently focuses on 
four major areas of Afghan justice system and legal order: 
 
a. law reform;  
b. assessment and development of technical, logistical and human resources; 
c. review of the structure and functions of the justice system and the division of 
labour among its various components; 
d. legal aid and access to justice  
 
Despite the formal reactivation of the formal Afghan justice ‘system’  throughout the 
country, it is far from prepared to deliver justice. It is a hugely devastated institution. 
The devastation not only includes extensive damage to buildings, office furniture, 
official records, and essential office equipment, but also includes the lack of qualified 
judges and other justice personnel. Importantly, it is highly fragmented, with little or 
no interaction among the judiciary, the police, the prosecution, and the 
prison/correction service (UNDP 2002; Johnson et al 2003). One of the main reasons 
for the lack of co-operation between the judiciary and the police is that the latter 
consist predominantly of Northern Alliance militia who are highly dependent on, and 
more loyal to their factional patrons than to the national Afghan Interim 
Administration. The police, in many ways, are merely an extension of the Northern 
Alliance’ s militia, who mainly represents Afghan Tajiks; they have no (or little) basic 
understanding of policing, and most of the people they police have no trust in them 
(Amnesty International 2003; Johnson et al 2003). 
 
In addition, corrective regimes and rehabilitative programmes for both adult and 
young offenders do not currently exist in Afghanistan. Although GDU ±DO WD¶DGHHE
(juvenile correctional institution) is nominally functioning in Kabul, the institution 
has neither the necessary facilities nor the professional personnel to deal with the 
serious personal and social problems that Afghan young rule-breakers face today. 
Thus, the current fragmented Afghan justice ‘system’  is highly ineffective and 
dysfunctional; it does not operate as a system at all. 

Similarly, the Afghan prison/correction ‘service’  has only a very basic existence in 
the main urban centres; it has no existence at all in many rural districts and some 
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provincial centres (Johnson et al 2003). The prison service in Kabul is a small unit 
that is directly controlled by the Ministry of the Interior. Many of the inmates are 
political prisoners who live in very over-crowded conditions and are fed by their 
relatives and friends. The situation in the prisons is particularly serious in Sheberghan 
and Herat. (Physicians for Human Rights, Report January 28, 2002). The sources 
report that these prisoners are treated in inhuman ways, and many of them suffer from 
illnesses related to malnutrition and overcrowding; dozens have died since their 
surrender to the US-led Northern Alliance forces in November 2001. 
 
However, Afghanistan has a large body of codified laws including the 1975 Afghan 
Civil Code, the 1976 Criminal Codes, the amended 1973 Law of Criminal Procedure, 
and the 1973 Law of Police and Gendarmes, which may just need some 
modifications. In addition, as stipulated in the 1964 constitution, in areas where no 
law existed the KDQDIL school of VKDUL¶D is considered as applicable. These various 
elements, which currently provide the interim legal framework, are to be used as an 
important element of post-war justice system in Afghanistan. 

,9)XQGDPHQWDO3ULQFLSOHVRI+XPDQ5LJKWVDQG7UDQVLWLRQDO-XVWLFH 

The past 25 years of war have badly brutalised Afghan society as a whole. During this 
period, serious abuses of human rights and war crimes (by all sides of the conflict) 
have taken place. These include massacres, looting of houses and property, rapes, 
revenge killings, illegal imprisonment, the torture and murder of prisoners/POW and 
assassinations of political opponents (Amnesty International Annual Report 2002; 
1HZVZHHN 26 August Issue 2002; Rubin 2003). These abuses of human rights 
continue to be committed by those with guns and money, many of whom currently 
occupy very important political and military positions in the country (Amnesty 
International 2003; Human Rights Watch Report, April 2002; Human Rights Watch 
Report, October 2002). This legacy of war, poverty, and religious fanaticism has 
particularly affected Afghan women, who have suffered from both cultural and 
structural inequalities (and violence) in Afghan society for centuries. The persistence 
of this situation over the past quarter of a century has produced a ‘culture of human 
rights abuses’  – patterns of behaviour and practices that are justified and even 
positively sanctioned in the shadow of warlordism in Afghanistan. 
 
The gravity of this situation has long been recognised by Afghans, the UN and 
international human rights organisations. While, conformity of post-war justice to 
‘international instruments ratified by Afghanistan’  was emphasised by the Bonn 
Agreement, the issue of past crime was not. The Bonn Agreement (2001:3), which 
authorised the establishment of an independent Human Rights Commission for 
Afghanistan says: ‘The Interim Administration shall, with the assistance of the United 
Nations, establish an independent Human Rights Commission whose responsibilities 
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will include human rights monitoring, investigation of violations of human rights, and 
development of domestic human rights institutions’ . But the Agreement that was 
concluded in a rush and under heavy pressure from the US and its rediscovered allies 
in the war against terrorism – the Afghan warlords - remained silent with regard to 
past crimes and a mechanism for investigating them. The need for this was more 
clearly reflected in the secretary-general’ s report to the Security Council in December 
2001, which stated that ‘The Afghan people and their international partners must 
commit themselves to addressing the problems of the past by 
ending impunity and ensuring accountability for past abuses, including gross and 
systematic violations of human rights’  (C/2002/1157, para 83). However a mechanism 
for addressing crimes of the past, and the role of the ‘international partners’  was not 
clarified. Several months later, Mary Robinson, the former United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights,raised the issue more explicitly and proposed that 
dealing with past crimes needed to be part and parcel of the process of reconstruction 
and institutional reform in post war Afghanistan: 
 
‘We know well from past experience, in Afghanistan and elsewhere, that sustainable 
peace, reconciliation, reconstruction and development cannot be built upon a 
foundation of impunity… There can be no amnesty for perpetrators of war crimes, 
crimes against humanity and gross violations of human rights. Just as has been the 
case in Sierra Leone, East Timor, Cambodia, the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, so 
it must be the case for Afghanistan. When we speak of accountability, we refer to an 
Afghan-led and owned process that has different elements. These are justice, truth 
telling, reconciliation and institutional reform… All these elements are indispensable’  
(Robinson, 9 March 2002). 
 
The lack of political will on part of key international players and the Afghan warlords 
who dominate the Afghan Transitional Authority means that this valuable advice has 
yet to be translated into action. One of the most obvious vehicles for implementing 
this advice is the Afghan Human Right Commission. However, since the birth of the 
Commission (about 16 months ago), it has had neither the power nor the resources to 
accomplish most of the tasks it was assigned. The Commission’ s work-plan to 
establish regional offices and ‘working groups’  in the main centres of Afghanistan has 
only been partially implemented. Even the  ‘working groups’  that have been 
established are largely ineffective. The ICG’ s (International Crisis Group) recent 
report (2003: 14) says that: ‘The working groups – which were to include human 
rights education, monitoring and investigations, women’ s human rights, and 
transitional justice – have been largely ineffective, hobbled in part by changed 
assignments for individual members.’  This raises serious questions about the 
independence of the ‘Independent’  Human Rights Commission of Afghanistan. 
Indeed, the problem for Afghanistan is that many of those accused of human rights 
violations and war crimes are key figures in the Afghan Transitional Authority and 
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military power-holders in various regions of the country. Thus, it is not surprising that 
since the installation of Afghan Interim Administration and its successor, the Afghan 
Transitional Authority, vast-scale human rights violations have taken place (Amnesty 
International 2003; Human Rights Watch Report, October 2002; Human Rights 
Watch, June 2002).  
 
Changing the ‘culture of human rights abuses’  needs, as Mary Robinson proposed, 
concrete inter-institutional efforts with strong and long-term support and commitment 
by the intentional community. Co-ordination of the activities of the Afghan Human 
Rights Commission, justice, educational institutions, at local and national levels, is 
particularly important. As will be discussed later, with the collaboration of Afghan 
educational and civil society institutions, the justice system can play an important role 
both in successful investigation of past abuses of human rights and in effective 
prevention of future violations. 

1RUPDWLYH/RFDWLRQRI.H\'LPHQVLRQVRI3RVWZDU-XVWLFH

What has been so far described would seem to indicate that the establishment of a 
new justice system in post-war Afghanistan is a complex and multi-dimentional 
process. Post-war Afghanistan needs an integrated framework of justice that reflects 
the interplay between VKDUL¶D, local/tribal institutions of informal justice, the Afghan 
interim (formal) legal framework, and fundamental principles of human rights. The 
normative locations of the key dimensions of post-war justice system in Afghanistan 
are illustrated in diagram 1 below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 



+53ULQFLSOHV,QWHUQDWLRQDO6WDQGDUGV
,QWHULP/HJDO)UDPHZRUN
-LUJD6KXUD
6KDUL¶D
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
'LDJUDP1RUPDWLYH/RFDWLRQRI.H\'LPHQVLRQVRI3RVWZDU-XVWLFHLQ$IJKDQLVWDQ 
 
 
Diagram 1, above, shows that as Islamic VKDUL¶D permeates different aspects of 
Afghan society, it constitutes the innermost part of post-war justice and social order in 
Afghanistan. What is meant by VKDUL¶D in this context, is its non- sectarian popular 
version that is not only part and parcel of the belief system of the overwhelming 
majority of the people of Afghanistan, but also strongly influences the social and 
cultural life of Afghan society. This version of Islamic teachings and VKDUL¶D  is 
understood by local people and is closely tied to their daily lives. In order to interpret 
VKDUL¶Din ways consistent with the spirit of Islam as well as the demands of the 21st 
century, a new body of MDPL¶DW±DOXODPD (society of Islamic scholars/jurists) needs 
to be established. Comprising Afghanistan’ s best, well-reputed and truly independent 
Islamic scholars/jurists (both VXQQLDQGVKHL¶LWH), the new MDPL¶DW±DOXODPD would 
also need to be advised by international legal experts - both from Muslim countries 
and the Western world. Final decisions made and IDWZDV (religious decrees) issued by 
the Afghan MDPL¶DW±DOXODPD would have a binding effect on all (Muslim) Afghans. 
This would ensure that VKDUL¶D is interpreted prudently and in the Afghan context. 
This would in turn, help strengthen the validity of a moderate and non-sectarian 
interpretation of VKDUL¶D at the expense of those ‘mported’  and used by extremist 
Islamic groups for their own political agendas. 
 
The non-sectarian popular version of VKDUL¶D has, over the centuries, closely 
interacted with the institutions of MLUJDVKXUD and existed in symbiotic relationships 
with them - the two have influenced one another significantly. Despite the opposition 
of the Afghan theocratic and Marxist regimes to traditional mechanisms of dispute 
settlement, MLUJDVKXUD has been widely used as the main alternative to the formal 
Afghan justice ‘system’ . More recent empirical evidence shows that MLUJDVKXUD is 
very commonly used in the resolution of conflicts in the current post-war situation in 
Afghanistan (Johnson et al 2003; UNDP 2002). This further confirms that the two 
internal dimensions of post-war justice in Afghanistan - popular Islam and MLUJDVKXUD
-are located at the heart of the normative order of Afghan society and are central to 
its justice system. This point is recognised by the Bonn Agreement (2001: 3), which 
advises the Afghan Judicial Commission and the United Nations to rebuild the post-
war Afghan domestic justice system in accordance with ‘Afghan legal traditions’  
among other things. The phrase ‘Afghan legal traditions’  in the context of the Bonn 
Agreement is elaborated by the UNAMA (2002: 5) in this way: ‘The issue of Afghan 
legal tradition refers to the customs, values and sense of justice acceptable to and 
revered by the people of Afghanistan. Justice, in the end, is what the community as a 
whole accepts as fair and satisfactory in the case of dispute or conflict, not what the 
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rulers perceive it to be.’  Indeed, justice that is imposed by the state is likely to remain 
‘justice on paper’ . 
 
With regard to the external dimension, as Afghanistan is increasingly integrated into 
the international community, the post-war Afghan justice system must be sensitised to 
international norms and the fundamental principles of human rights. This dimension 
can no longer be completely separated from the normative order of Afghan society in 
the 21st century – Afghanistan, today, is as much part of the emerging ‘global culture’  
as any other nation in the world. There would, however, be a degree of 
tension/conflict between some aspects of VKDUL¶D and  MLUJDVKXUD and the Western 
conception of human rights principles. This issue relates to the broader discussion 
about the ‘clash of civilisations’  or ‘dialogue of civilisations’ , which is beyond the 
scope of this paper. However as mentioned earlier, finding solutions to such 
tension/conflict would be the responsibility of Afghan  MDPL¶DW±DO XODPD assisted 
and advised by international legal experts in the West and in the Islamic world. 
 
In the current situation, it is the Afghan interim legal framework which is the centre of 
gravity. Located in the middle of the Afghan normative order, it has the formal 
authority to act as a medium of communication between the demands of the external 
and internal dimensions of post-war justice in Afghanistan – between the demands of 
the moral order of the Afghan society and the requirements of living in an 
increasingly ‘globalised’  international community. It is the future popularly approved 
Afghan constitution and other laws (the ‘existing laws’  in the interim period) that 
would define the role and limits of Islamic VKDUL¶D within a formal legal framework. 
Likewise, informal local/tribal institutions of informal justice would need to be in 
harmony with the goals of the Afghan national state, its legal order and principles of 
human rights. However, no attempt should be made by formal authorities to codify 
customary law; MLUJDVKXUD must continue to function as a genuinely local institution 
representing local people and their values/interests. This is to ensure that local people 
have the ownership of the justice system and are able to apply customary laws 
flexibly in various local contexts within which different conflicts are resolved.  
 
In the same vein, it is also the interim legal framework (and future popularly approved 
Afghan constitution/other laws) that has the responsibility to define human rights in 
ways that do not violate the cultural and religious sensibilities of the people of 
Afghanistan. Reaching final decisions about such issues would be mainly the 
responsibility of the Afghan MDPL¶DW ±DO  XODPD and Human Rights Commission. 
However, post-war Afghanistan would need to learn from the experiences of other 
Muslim nations, where human rights principles are successfully integrated into their 
domestic laws. This analysis of the interrelationships among the various dimensions 
of post-war justice in Afghanistan is further translated into an integrated model. 
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7RZDUGVDQ,QWHJUDWHG0RGHORID3RVW:DU-XVWLFH6\VWHP
 
The examination of the key elements of Afghan justice, above, shows that a mere 
reinstatement of the pre-war Afghan justice system (or a superficially reformed one) 
will not have the capacity to face the challenges of the post-war situation in 
Afghanistan and meet the demands of the 21st century. It points to the need for the 
development of a new post-war model of justice – an integrated multi-dimensional 
model that represents Afghan cultural traditions, religious values, and legal norms, 
and at the same time has the capacity to draw on human rights principles. Thus, an 
experimental model is proposed, which is illustrated in Diagram 2 below:  
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
'LDJUDP$Q,QWHJUDWHG0RGHORID3RVW:DU-XVWLFH6\VWHP'LVWULFW/HYHOLQ$IJKDQLVWDQ


Diagram 2 shows that the post-war justice model proposes the establishment of 
MLUJDVKXUD and a genuinely independent Human Rights units alongside the existing 
&LYLO'LVSXWHVDQG&ULPLQDO2IIHQFHVDW'LVWULFW/HYHO
Civil Incidents 
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court of justice (based on VKDUL¶D and positive law) and their integration into the 
overall system of justice at district level. The MLUJDVKXUDunit would bestaffed by one 
or two full-time paid co-ordinators based in a fully equipped local office with a MLUJD 
hall. These local officers would replace DPHU±HKRTXT (law officer) who is closely 
connected with the formal justice system and has a reputation for corruption. 
JLUJDVKXUD would be conducted by around half a dozen elected local elders with 
expertise in traditional dispute settlement and/or legitimate social influence. The 
elders would be paid only an honorarium (in form of consultancy fees) and travel 
expenses; the expenses of hosting MLUJDVKXUD would also be paid from the public 
purse. Although not illustrated in the diagram, above, MLUJDVKXUDwould also advise 
the district administrator in issues relating to local governance. 
 
As diagram 2 illustrates the MLUJDVKXUDunit would mainly deal with minor criminal, 
and all types of civil incidents at district level. In the case of civil incidents, people 
would have the choice to start their cases with either jLUJDVKXUD, or with the district 
court of formal justice. However, all serious criminal cases would be dealt with 
exclusively by the district court of justice, and those cases that MLUJDVKXUD fail to 
resolve satisfactorily would be referred back to the formal process of the district 
justice system. The referral would be based on a joint decision by MLUJDVKXUDdistrict 
judge and the district administrator. While paper work and official procedures must be 
kept to the minimum, the final SULNUD (ruling) should be communicated to both the 
district court of justice and the Human Rights unit to ensure that it is in line with 
national legal norms and with accepted principles of human rights. In this way, 
MLUJDVKXUD would not only significantly reduce the workload of the court of justice; 
more importantly, the use of this traditional local/tribal institution of dispute 
settlement would empower ordinary people to have ownership of the justice 
processes. 
 
In addition, the processes, rituals and outcome of MLUJD as a traditional tribal/local 
Afghan institution resemble closely the spirit, values and principles of ‘restorative 
justice’  – one of the most recent paradigms in modern criminology and criminal 
justice. Although the phrase -‘restorative justice’  - is defined differently in different 
social contexts, it proposes a community based model of justice that places special 
emphasis on the restoration of dignity, peace, and relationships, between offenders 
and victims; it provides restitution to victims and promotes the reintegration offenders 
into the community (Braithwaite 2002a; Braithwaite 2002b; Braithwaite 2003; 
Bottoms 2003, Hudson 2003; Johnston 2001; Van Ness 2003). The theory of 
restorative justice, which emphasises informalism and community involvement, is 
increasingly translated into practice in different parts of the world, especially in 
Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and South Africa (Daly 2003; Morris and Maxwell 
2003; Roberts and Roach 2003; Skelton 2002). 
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The Human Rights unit, on the other hand, would be run by two full-time truly 
independent, highly educated and well-reputed officials based in well-equipped local 
offices. In order to counter-balance the male-dominated MLUJD unit, these officers 
should mainly be female (as far as practical in the current situation). In the short term, 
the unit’ s officials would act as ambassadors of human rights, and their role would be 
mainly educational. Liasing closely with district level educational institutions, the 
human rights officials would prepare educational and human rights awareness 
materials, and disseminate them in culturally sensitive ways. They would also 
organise lectures and seminars given by leading nationally recognised human rights 
activists and other Afghan personalities. However, soon after the district Human 
Rights unit is fully established at the local level, it would have the power to pro-
actively investigate serious past human rights abuses and war crimes; it would liase 
closely with the Independent Afghan Human Rights Commission, compiling serious 
past human rights abuses and war crimes and reporting them to the Special Court of 
Human Rights of Afghanistan (Truth Commission) being considering by the ATA. 
The unit would also be the first point of receiving new cases/complaints of human 
rights abuses, including issues relating to domestic violence (mainly violence against 
women) and dealing with them in culturally sensitive ways. In addition, the human 
rights unit would advise the district administrator about local human rights issues, and 
would have the authority to monitor human rights violations by local government 
officials as well. It is important to emphasise that the Human Rights Unit must be 
totally independent from the state, warlords and other political factions. Otherwise, it 
will become an ineffective body, and even an instrument in the hands of those with 
guns, power and money for staying in positions of power. 
 
The Diagram further illustrates complex interrelationships between the district court 
of justice, MLUJDVKXUD and Human Rights units: as mentioned earlier, while the final 
SULNUD (ruling) of MLUJDVKXUD should be reported to both the district court of justice 
and to the Human Rights unit, the latter two would consult the former for its mediator 
role in cases that need diversion from the formal justice processes. Likewise, 
MLUJDPDUDND and Human Rights units would consult the court of justice about cases 
that may need to be dealt with in more strictly legalistic ways within the criminal 
justice system. A positive and constructive interaction between the state and local 
civil society institutions would provide an integrated inter-agency justice system that 
is effective, accessible and humane. However, such a system of justice is part and 
parcel of the processes of democratisation, institutional reform (and building), 
disarmament, and the establishment of the rule of law in post-war Afghanistan. It can 
only, therefor, successfully operate in a social and political environment where the 
rule of law prevails, not the rule of gun and money.  
 
&RQFOXVLRQ
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What has been discussed in this paper shows that despite the historical fragmentation 
and the current devastated state of the Afghan justice system,Afghanistan has a rich 
legal culture that could partly be used as a basis for rebuilding a new post-war justice 
system. This legal culture also provides important lessons for Afghans to avoid 
repeating the mistakes of past rulers of the country who mainly used their systems of 
justice as an instrument of state control. An unfortunate consequence of this has been 
the development of justice systems that have been elitist, inaccessible and corrupt, 
which alienated ordinary people form the state and its formal institutions of justice. 
This further resulted in the huge lack of communication between the Afghan state and 
ordinary people, which further widened the ‘culture gap’  between cities and rural 
areas in Afghanistan. Thus, it has not been a coincidence that ordinary people, 
especially in rural Afghanistan, have traditionally preferred not to use formal justice 
institutions for the resolution of their disputes. 
 
The integrated model of post-war justice system in Afghanistan proposes inter-
institutional co-ordination between the Afghan formal justice system, informal justice, 
educational, and human rights institutions. It is argued that the incorporation of 
MLUJDVKXUD into the formal justice system would not only simplify the justice process 
for ordinary people, more importantly it would enable them to have its ownership. 
This, it is maintained, would make the justice system more widely accessible, cost-
effective, and expeditious. Likewise, addressing issues relating to the vast violation of 
human rights during the past 25 years of brutal war and challenging the existing 
‘culture of human rights abuses’  effectively, need inter-institutional co-ordination. 
The creation of a truly independent Human Rights unit, and its incorporation into the 
justice system is an effective way of creating awareness about human rights, 
accounting for past crimes, and preventing future violations of human rights, 
 
More importantly, this inter-institutional interaction between the local justice, 
executive, educational, and civil society institutions would provide an important 
channel of communication between the state and ordinary Afghan citizens. This 
would gradually result in the inclusion of women and those without guns and money 
into the political, economic and cultural life of the Afghan society. These processes 
would further pave the way for the gradual replacement of a ‘culture of human rights 
abuses’  in Afghan society by a culture of respect for human rights and the rule of law. 
Indeed, communication plays an important role in social integration (Habermas 1987) 
and in strengthening social solidarity (Durkheim1984) that Afghanistan badly needs 
today. However in order to test the applicability of this model in the real world, it first 
needs to be thoroughly discussed among Afghan and international legal experts and 
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ordinary people, at grass root level, and then piloted in selected districts in 
Afghanistan.  
 
1RWHV
 
1
 Carter and Connor (1989: 9) operationally define VKXUD in this way: ‘A VKXUD is a 
group of individuals which meets only in response to a specific need in order to 
decide how to meet the need. In most cases, this need is to resolve a conflict between 
individuals, families, groups of families, or whole tribes.’  This description would 
seem to indicate that VKXUD and MLUJD are fundamentally very similar Afghan informal 
(non-state) mechanisms of conflict resolution that operate in varying social and tribal 
contexts. 
 
2
 -LUJDand PDUDND involve very similar processes and the main constituent elements
of the two are not fundamentally different from one another. Therefore, the concepts 
are often used interchangeably. However, the fact that MLUJDdeals with serious and 
important conflicts within the tribe (or between tribes) such as murder, disputes over 
land, mountain, jangle/woods, and the fact that it operates at a higher level of tribal 
formation, its social organization is more structured. 0DUDND on the other hand,
mostly deals with civil and relatively less serious criminal matters at local village (or 
inter-village) level, and therefore, it is loosely structured and its related rituals are not 
as elaborate as those of a tribal MLUJDare. 
 
5HIHUHQFHV
 
Amnesty International (2003) ‘Afghanistan: Police Reconstruction Essential for 
Protection of Human Rights’  12 March Report, AI: London. 
 
Amnesty International, $QQXDO5HSRUW±$IJKDQLVWDQ: http://web. Amnesty.org 
 
Bottoms, A. (2003) ‘Some Sociological Reflections on Restorative Justice’  in 
5HVWRUDWLYH-XVWLFHDQG&ULPLQDO-XVWLFH, edited by A. Hirsch, J. Roberts, A. Bottoms, 
K. Roach and M. Schiff, Oxford: Hart Publishing. 
 
Braithwaite, J. (1989) &ULPH6KDPHDQG5HLQWHJUDWLRQ, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Braithwaite, J. (2002a) ‘Setting Standards for Restorative Justice’ , %ULWLVK-RXUQDORI
&ULPLQRORJ\ 42/3: 563 – 577. 
 
Braithwaite, J. (2002b) 5HVWRUDWLYH-XVWLFHDQG5HVWRUDWLYH5HJXODWLRQ New York: 
Oxford university press. 
 22
 
Braithwaite, J. (2003) ‘Principles of Restorative Justice’  in 5HVWRUDWLYH-XVWLFHDQG
&ULPLQDO-XVWLFH, edited by A. Hirsch, J. Roberts, A. Bottoms, K. Roach and M. 
Schiff, Oxford: Hart Publishing. 
 
Brezeznski, Z. (1998) ‘Les Revelations d’ um Ancien Counseilleur de Carter’ , in /H
1RXYHO2EVHUYDWHXUJanuary Issue 15 – 21, Paris. (The Interview was translated into 
English by 5HSXEOLFRI&KLQD, edited by Ronald Troyer, London: Prager Press. 
 
7KH%RQQ$JUHHPHQW (2001), Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan 
Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions, Bonn, 
December 2001. 
 
Canfield, R. (1996) 'Ethnic, Regional, and Sectarian Alignments in Afghanistan'. In 
7KH 
6WDWH5HOLJLRQDQG(WKQLF3ROLWLFV$IJKDQLVWDQ,UDQ3DNLVWDQ, Ed. by A. Banuazizi 
and M. Weiner, New York: Syracuse University Press. 
 
Carter, L. and Connor, K. (1989) $3UHOLPLQDU\,QYHVWLJDWLRQRI&RQWHPSRUDU\
$IJKDQ&RXQFLOVPeshawar: ACBAR. 
 
&RQVWLWXWLRQRI$IJKDQLVWDQ (1964) Kabul: Franklin Book Programme (Education 
Press). 
 
Cooley, J. (2002) 8QKRO\:DUV, London: Pluto Press. 
 
Daly, K. (2003) ‘Mind the Gap: Restorative Justice in Theory and Practice’  in 
5HVWRUDWLYH-XVWLFHDQG&ULPLQDO-XVWLFH, edited by A. Hirsch, J. Roberts, A. Bottoms, 
K. Roach and M. Schiff, Oxford: Hart Publishing 

'HFUHHRQWKH(VWDEOLVKPHQWRI$IJKDQ-XGLFLDO&RPPLVVLRQ(2002) Kabul: UNAMA. 
 
Dupree, L. (1980) $IJKDQLVWDQ. Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
 
Durkheim, E. (1964) 7KH'LYLVLRQRI/DERXULQ6RFLHW\ New York: Free Press. 
 
Faiz-zad, M. (1989) -LUJD+DLH%R]RUJH0LOLH$IJKDQLVWDQLahore. 
 
Farhadi, R. (2000) ‘Tajikane Afghanistan wa Qadamhaie Ashti Bain Aishan’  in 
4DGDPKDLH$VKWLZD0DVDXOLDWHPD$IJKDQLVWDQKabultec: Falls Church, VA. 
 
*K\DWKXO/XJKDW (1871) Edited by Maulana Gheyathoddin, Kanpur Press: New Delhi. 
 23
 
Glatzer, B. (1998) ’ Is Afghanistan on the Brink of Ethnic and Tribal Disintegration?’ 
in )XQGDPHQWDOLVP5HERUQ"$IJKDQLVWDQDQGWKH7DOLEDQ edited by William Maley, 
New York: St. Martins 
 
Goodhand, J. (2003) µ)URP:DU(FRQRP\WR3HDFH(FRQRP\"¶ Paper Presented at a 
Symposium on State Reconstruction and International Engagement in Afghanistan, 
May 30 – June 1, Bonn. 
 
Habermas, J. (1984) 7KH7KHRU\RI&RPPXQLFDWLYH$FWLRQ9RO5HDVRQDQG
5DWLRQDOLVDWLRQRI6RFLHW\, Boston: Beacon Press. 
 
Hudson, B. (2003) ‘Victims and Offenders’  in 5HVWRUDWLYH-XVWLFHDQG&ULPLQDO
-XVWLFH, edited by A. Hirsch, J. Roberts, A. Bottoms, K. Roach and M. Schiff, Oxford: 
Hart Publishing 
 
Hashemi, M. (2000) ‘Qadamhaie Asshti Baine Uzbakan’ , in 4DGDPKDLH$VKWLZD
0DVDXOLDWHPD$IJKDQKD: Kabultec: Falls Church, VA. 

Human Rights Watch - 5HSRUW$SULO, Paying for the Taliban's Crimes: Abuses 
Against Ethnic Pashtuns in Northern Afghanistan, Vol. 14, No. 2 (C). 

Human Rights Watch, -XQH, ‘The Warlords are Plotting a Comeback’ : 
www.hrw.org 
 
Human Rights Watch, October 2002 Report, Afghanistan: ALL OUR HOPES ARE 
CRASHED – Violence and Repression in Western Afghanistan, Vol. 14, No. 7 (C), 
www.hrw.org 
 
ICG (2003) Afghanistan: Judicial Reform and Transitional justice, Brussels (Asia 
Report No 45): www.crisisweb.org 
 
Johnson, C. Maley, W. Their, A. Wardak, A. (2003) $IJKDQLVWDQ¶V3ROLWLFDODQG
&RQVWLWXWLRQDO'HYHORSPHQW, London: ODI. 
 
Johnston, G. (2001) 5HVWRUDWLYH-XVWLFH,GHDV9DOXHV'HEDWHV, Cullompton: Willan. 
 
Kamali, M. (1985/DZ LQ$IJKDQLVWDQ$6WXG\RI&RQVWLWXWLRQV0DWULPRQLDO/DZ
DQGWKH-XGLFLDU\, Leiden: E.J. Brill. 
 
Malekyar, S. (2000) ‘Qadamhaie Ashti wa Solh dar Ananaie Hazarahaie Afghanistan’  
in 4DGDPKDLH$VVKWLZD0DVDXOLDWHPD$IJKDQKDKabultec: Falls Church, VA. 
 24
 
Morris, A. and Maxwell G. (2003) ‘Restorative Justice in New Zealand’  in 
5HVWRUDWLYH-XVWLFHDQG&ULPLQDO-XVWLFH, edited by A. Hirsch, J. Roberts, A. Bottoms, 
K. Roach and M. Schiff, Oxford: Hart Publishing 
 
Noelle-Karimi (1998) ‘The Loya Jirga – An Effective Political Instrument?’  in 
)XQGDPHQWDOLVP5HERUQ"$IJKDQLVWDQDQGWKH7DOLEDQ edited by William Maley, 
New York: St. Martins. 
 
1HZVZHHN(2002) ‘The Death Convoy of Afghanistan’ , 26 August Issue, pp. 15 – 25. 
 
Olesen, A. (1995) ,VODPDQG3ROLWLFVLQ$IJKDQLVWDQ Curzon: Surrey. 

3DVKWR 'HVFULSWLYH 'LFWLRQDU\ (1978), Kabul: The Academy of Sciences of 
Afghanistan. 

Physicians for Human Rights, Report on Conditions at Sheberghan Prison, Northern 
Afghanistan, January 28, 2002, www.prisoner-rights@hrea.org  
 
Roberts, J. and Roach, K. (2003) ‘Restorative Justice in Canada’  in 5HVWRUDWLYH
-XVWLFHDQG&ULPLQDO-XVWLFH, edited by A. Hirsch, J. Roberts, A. Bottoms, K. Roach 
and M. Schiff, Oxford: Hart Publishing 
 
Rubin, B. (1999) ‘The political Economy of War and Peace in Afghanistan’ , A paper 
presented at the meeting of the Afghanistan Support Group, Stockholm, Sweden. 
 
Rubin, B. (2003) 7UDQVLWLRQDO-XVWLFHLQ$IJKDQLVWDQ, The Anthony Hyman Memorial 
Lecture, SOAS, London. 
 
Robinson, M.,QVROLGDULW\ZLWKWKH$IJKDQSHRSOHWRZDUGVLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRIWKH
KXPDQULJKWVSURYLVLRQVRIWKH%RQQ$JUHHPHQW´Statement: Afghan National 
Workshop on Human Rights, Kabul, 9 March 2002 
(www.pcpafg.org/organizations/Human_rights) 

Skelton, A. (2002) ‘Restorative Justice as a Framework for Juvenile Justice Reform: 
A South African Perspective’ , %ULWLVK-RXUQDORI&ULPLQRORJ\ 42/3: 496 – 513. 
 
UNAMA (2002) 7KH-XGLFLDO&RPPLVVLRQ5HEXLOGLQJWKH-XVWLFH6\VWHP, Kabul: 
UNAMA. 
 
 25
UNDP (2002) 6WUDWHJ\IRU-XVWLFH6\VWHP5HIRUPDQGWKH5XOHRI/DZ, Kabul: The 
United Nations Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for 
Afghanistan. 
 
Van Ness, D. (2003) ‘Proposed Basic Principles on the Use of Restorative Justice: 
Recognising the Aims and Limits of Restorative Justice ’  in 5HVWRUDWLYH-XVWLFHDQG
&ULPLQDO-XVWLFH, edited by A. Hirsch, J. Roberts, A. Bottoms, K. Roach and M. 
Schiff, Oxford: Hart Publishing 

Wardak, A. (2002a)'Structures of Authority and Establishing the Rule of Law in 
Post-War Afghanistan', a Paper Presented at(VWDEOLVKLQJWKH5XOHRI/DZDQG
*RYHUQDQFHLQ3RVW&RQIOLFW6RFLHWLHV Conference Organised by Harvard University, 
the United Nations Association - USA, and Koç University, Istanbul, July11 - 14.  
 
Wardak, A. (2002b) ‘-LUJD: Power and Traditional Conflict Resolution in 
Afghanistan’  in /DZ DIWHU *URXQG =HUR, Edited by John Strawson, London: 
Cavendish. 
 
Wardak, A. (2003a) ‘The Tribal and Ethnic Composition of Afghan Society’  in 
$IJKDQLVWDQ(VVHQWLDO)LHOG*XLGHVWR+XPDQLWDULDQDQG&RQIOLFW =RQHV(Second 
Edition), edited by Edward Girardet & Jonathan Walter, Geneva: Crosslines Ltd. 
 
Wardak, A. (2003b) ‘Crime and Social Control in Saudi Arabia’  in J. Sheptycki and 
A. Wardak (Eds.) 7UDQVQDWLRQDO DQG &RPSDUDWLYH &ULPLQRORJ\. London:
Cavendish. 
                                                     
Dr. Ali Wardak is a Senior Lecturer and Director of ‘Black and Asian Offenders Project’  at the Centre for 
Criminology, University of Glamorgan, UK (Email: awardak@glam.ac.uk) 
 
 

 
 
 
